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I Introduction 
Increasing interest in rural poverty alleviation has resulted in a new focus in the forest dependent poor 
(Fisher, 2004; Pattanayak et al., 2004; Angelsen and Winder, 2003; Kumar, 2002; Kumar et al., 2000; Arnold, 
2001; World Bank, 2001; Wunder, 2001; Cavendish, 1999; Scherr et al., 2002; Somanathan, 1991). Forest 
contributes significantly to the economic, social and environmental well being of a country. Its role is more 
pronounced in a developing country like India that has a predominantly agriculture-based rural economy. Forest 
in India constitutes just over one-fifth of the land area of the country. Forest meets nearly 40 per cent of the 
energy needs of the country (more than 80 per cent in the rural sector), the bulk of it as direct subsidy to the 
poor. In India, fuelwood is a source of livelihood for more than eleven million people. An estimated fifty nine 
per cent of rural households in India obtain their wood from home-grown source or free collection (World 
Bank, 2006: 46); only twenty one per cent pay for all of their wood (Kholin and Ostwald, 2001, cited in World 
Bank, 2006:46). It also provides about 25 per cent of the fodder needs of vast cattle population. Forest products 
are crucial to the rural and tribal economy. The dependence of tribal on forests for sustenance and income 
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generation is also significant, ranging from 15 to 84 per cent, depending on the community and region (Sarmah 
and Rai, 2000:207). The World Bank Report (2006) indicates that forests offer vast potential for poverty 
reduction and rural economy growth in India while also supporting critical national conservation goals (World 
Bank, 2006: xiii). The Report also revels that half of India’s 89 million tribal people, the most disadvantaged 
section of society, live in forest fringe areas and forests have the potential to improve the livelihoods of forest 
dwelling people, particularly tribal people who are the most disadvantaged group in Indian society (ibid:2). The 
overall estimate is that 33 per cent of the tribal earn their livelihood from forests and forest products (Sarmah 
and Rai, 2000:207). Many of the products, including non-timber forest products (NTFPs), provide sustenance to 
the Indian rural people who collect a large part of their day-to-day necessities, including food and medicines, 
from the forests (ibid). 
Issues relating to households’ income accounts in rural areas of southern Malawi in Africa are presented 
by Fisher (2004) in two sources – forest and non-forest (farm, self-employment, non-forest wage work, sales 
assets and transfers)1. There is rich empirical evidence to support the claim that forest is an important source of 
income for the poor forest fringe households through the extraction of wood (timber and firewood) and non-
timber forest products (NTFPs) or non-wood forest products (NWFPs) by preserving the forest resource 
sustainable with the help of cooperative management (Somanathan, 1991; Pattanayak et al., 2004; Guha, 1989; 
Jodha, 1986, 1992; Kumar et al., 2000; World Bank, 2001). In an attempt to measure the effect of JFM on 
various social groups – landless, marginal farmer, small farmer, medium farmer and large farmer – 
Kumar(2002) observes that the poorer sections of village community are disproportionally dependent on non-
wood forest products both for subsistence and extra income due to low opportunity cost of labour (p.770). 
Access to forest for fuelwood is substantially important to local people and makes substantial contribution to 
households’ welfare (Pattanayak et al., 2004: 176). The demand for fuelwood collection for poor households is 
inelastic with respect to their travel cost (or the shadow price of fuelwood) indicating that fuelwood is essential 
for these households, whereas improved economic conditions that increase household wealth and raise 
opportunity cost reduce household dependence on fuel wood from forest(ibid:175). Asset-poor in Malawi in 
southern Africa are observed more reliant on both low return forest activities (LRFA) – e.g. fuel wood and non-
timber forest products – and high return forest activities (HRFA) – e.g. timber – compared with the better off 
and access to forest income in rural Malawi help the poor not only to prevent by supplementing income, but 
also to improve their living standard over time (Fisher, 2004: 147-151). Without any legal punishment by law 
traditional cooperative management system based on self-enforcing social norms and customs – each person 
knows that if they cheat, the other will as well, and to their supply of forest products in years to come will be 
jeopardized – were enough to restrain people from overlooping and looping trees from forest and the prevailing 
conditions ensures that the forest dependent households did not suffer from a scarcity of forest resource on 
which they were so dependent (Somanathan, 1991:PE 38-9). 
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This paper attempts to find out the economic outcome of joint forest management (JFM) programme for 
forest fringe communities and government who jointly manage the forest protection activities, based on a field 
survey of Bankura district in West Bengal. The present paper is important in that it tries to examine as to 
whether the institutional arrangements of community management under JFM have been economically 
beneficial for its member households belonging to agricultural households under three categories – landless, 
marginal farmer and small farmer – which depends on forest for their subsistence and income, compared with 
strict regulatory policy system of government before JFM, and contribute to extract forest resources sustainably. 
This paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the historical perspective of the study. A short review of 
relevant common pool resource (CPR) game is contained in section III. Section IV deals with survey design and 
methodology of the empirical exercise. Section V covers the findings of the study. Conclusions and policy 
implications appear in section VI. 
II Historical Perspective  
Evidence of earliest forest management by the state is found in Kautilya’s Arthashastra (BC 321) which 
refers to ‘forests’ being managed as ‘state reserves for revenue’ and for ‘public use’ (Sarmah and Rai, 2000: 
209). But, indeed, no rulers in India did execute these policies in the management of forest resources of our 
economy before 1988. Rather, the forest policy of India before the year 1988 was oriented with commercial 
need either of the government or of the rulers of India without safeguarding the traditional rights and 
concessions of the forest fringe communities on forestland. There was no systematic management of forest in 
the country before 1865. Some of the recorded forest conservation measures were initiated by Emperor Ashoka, 
as is testified by the decrees inscribed in rock and pillar edicts (ibid: 209). This concern continued till the 
beginning of the 6th century. Systematic management of forest in country began in 1864 with the appointment 
of Dietrich Brandis, a trained German forester, as the Inspector General of Forests. The government decided to 
treat forests as state property by enacting the Indian Forest Act, 1865 (Act VII of 1865). Although, the first Act 
of forestry in India was enacted in 1865, the major laws governing forestry have formulated by the Indian 
Forest Act of 1878, Indian Forest Act of 1927 and the Forest Conservation Act of 1980 (World Bank, 2006: 
xvi). The Forest Conservation Act of 1878 and that of 1927 emphasized commercial timber production. The 
Forest Conservation Act of 1980 and the 1988 National Forest Policy shifted the pendulum strongly towards 
forest conservation and joint forest management (ibid: 16-18). The revision of the National Forest Policy in 
1988 marks a major departure from the earlier policies which emphasis on production of commercial wood and 
disregard for local need (Poffenberger, 1995; Sarmah and Rai, 2000: 213), because Government of India, then, 
could understand that until and unless the benefit of forest fringe communities is secured, neither forest 
resources nor forest management can be sustainable. So, in order to execute sustainable forest management 
system, the active participation of local forest communities in forest management for conservation and 
development plans of forest resources and the participatory forest management on usufruct sharing basis for 
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safeguarding their traditional rights subject to the carrying capacity of forest was first introduced and 
implemented by the National Forest Policy of 1988.  
However, far-reaching developments in the demographic, economic, social and environmental fields 
have resulted in the revision of the National Forest Policy in 1988. The national policy of 1988 constitutes a 
significant departure from earlier policies of forest management practice, for its emphasizes on: 1) obtaining the 
active participation of local people in forest conservation and development programmes of local forest lands; 
and 2) the benefit sharing arrangements, which is intended to provide village communities living near the 
forests a stake in the protection and development on the degraded forests. 
JFM programmes in India currently span over 27 states, represent 85000 village communities, and cover 
more than 17.3 million hectors of forestland. The programme encompasses an estimated 8.3 million families, 
half of which are SC and ST (Bahuguna, 2004, cited in World Bank, 2006:1). Most JFM committees use the 
surrounding forests mainly as a safety net or for regular or seasonal subsistence production of firewood, fodder 
and minor forest products.  
The JFM in West Bengal has its origin in the success achieved in rejuvenating a patch of 17 hectares of 
degraded forests under a pilot project implemented during 1972 near Arabari in Midnapore district. About 618 
families living in 11 villages lying in the fringe voluntarily protected these forests when in return they were 
assured provision of fuelwood and fodder from the regenerated forest and employment in forestry activities. In 
1987 these villagers were also declared as beneficiaries for these rejuvenated forests and granted 25 per cent 
share from the revenue earned from final harvest. This project made both government and community benefited 
(SFR, 2000:47). It seems to be relevant to mention that the key precursor to JFM in India, from a management 
perspective, was a local level initiative, dating from the early 1970s, in the Arabari in West Bengal (Jeffery and 
Sundar, 1999:28). 
In West Bengal, the JFM movement gathered momentum when in 1989 a programme of resuscitation 
and reestablishment of moribund sal and other hardwood forests in the districts of Midnapore, Bankura, Purulia, 
Burdwan and Birbhum in south West Bengal was initiated by the government with the active participation and 
involvement of the local people. West Bengal government’s resolution in 1989 was issued by declaring the 
principles of sharing of duties, responsibilities as well as the usufructs from the forests to the participant local 
people living in the fringe of the forests. The procedures for establishment of the institution called forest 
protection committee (FPC), comprising of these participants as members, were also defined. The foundation of 
an innovative forest protection system and the participatory forest management was thus laid for the forests of 
south West Bengal which covers approximately 38 per cent of the total forest area of the State. West Bengal 
State Forest Report (2000) clearly mentions: 
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“As a result of participatory and joint forest management activities in south West Bengal the vast tract 
of scattered, over-exploited and degraded forests containing mainly the sal were resuscitated and restored to 
productivity with great improvement in quality and density” (SFR, 2000: 47). 
Government report (State Forest Report, 2000) reveals that the overexploitation of trees for timber was 
so severe that thousand and thousand hectares of forest lands in the south West Bengal except Sundarban were 
almost treated as bare plain land, when the JFM was established; but such lands are almost secured after JFM 
programme. Secondly, government revenue from the degraded forest was almost nil when the JFM was 
established, but it has significantly increased after JFM. 
However, with regard to the historical perspective of the Government of India in general and 
Government of West Bengal in particular are concerned, we usually observe two forest policies of the 
government – strictly regulatory policy (SRP) and cooperative policy (CP). The SRP was usually used before 
1988 when the JFM was established and CP has been executing as soon as the JFM came into being. Hence the 
strategy-set of government is {SRP, CP}.  
On the contrary, against the custodian forest management system (SRP action of government), the local 
forest fringe communities in different parts of India have mobilized repeatedly from long past to protect their 
traditional right on forest (Poffenberger, 1995). In keeping with this, Santal, Bhumij and Mahato tribal with 
some low cast Hindus in south West Bengal mobilized repeatedly against Mughal and British rulers to protect 
their traditional rights on forestland from long past. Chur Rebellion (from 1767 to 1805), Naik Revolt (1806-
16), Hul Rebellion (1855) are the glaring examples of the history in south West Bengal where forest fringe 
communities organized resistance against rulers of India to protect their own right in forestland. During Chur 
Rebellion, the tribal communities of this area mobilized resistance through a series of armed revolts against the 
British empowered a new class of zaminders who took attempts to clear forest land and convert it into 
agricultural land to increase their revenue. Tribal guerrillas were so effective that even as late as 1800, after 
nearly forty years of British occupation, a collector reported that two thirds of Midnapore consisted of jungle, 
the greater part of which was inaccessible’(Sarker and Das, 2004: 172). Yet, gradually the Company succeeded 
in strengthening its control, despite subsequent revolts by forest people, such as the Naik Revolt (1806-16). The 
pressure on the forest grew further by the 1860s as the growing railway system demanded immense quantities 
of sal logs to provide sleepers for rail bed. Commercial demand for timber accelerated forest cutting, and raised 
the value of forestlands. Timber merchants rushed in, even before the rail lines opened and began leasing or 
purchasing large tracts from the Midnapore Zamindary Company and other zamindars. In early 1855, six to 
seven thousand Santal tribal from, Birbhum, Bankura, Chotonagpur and Hazribagh began meeting for 
organizing resistance in response to their growing marginalization. On July 16, 1855 some ten thousand tribal, 
under the messianic leadership of four Santal brothers stood their ground firmly and fought with bows and a 
kind of battle-axe in a battle near Pirpaiti (Dutta, 1940: 26). The revolt collapsed eventually after half their 
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members were reportedly killed. Despite their defeat, the Hul Rebellion (as it is known among the Santal) 
profoundly influenced the ideological development of many Santal communities (Duyker, 1987: 35), and lives on 
in the songs and oral traditions of the tribal people of this area. 
JFM can, thus, be seen to emerge as the major policy change and attempt to create a new relationship 
between the government and the community in terms of cooperative framework. Thus, from the standpoint of 
the forest fringe community is concerned, one may usually find two actions of the community on its forestland 
– fighting policy (FP), which was mainly executed when government’s SRP was in operation. They usually 
executed this policy to meet up their livelihood security. The cooperative policy (CP) of forest fringe 
communities has been gaining ground on as soon as the JFM programme came into being. So the community’s 
strategy-set is {FP, CP}. 
III Review of the Relevant CPR Game 
The daily livelihood of vast masses of the rural poor in many countries depends on the success with 
which common pool resources (CPRs) – such as forest and water resources – are managed and on the 
environmental consequences of their management. “CPR (common pool resource) management is a collective 
action dilemma: a situation in which mutual cooperation is collectively rational for the group as a whole, but 
individual cooperation is not necessarily individually rational for each member”(Dayton-Johnson and Bardhan, 
2002:577). There is now a vast literature which examines the problem of extracting commonly owned 
renewable resources by game-theoretic framework (Clark, 1980; Dasgupta and Heal, 1979; Ostrom et al., 1990; 
Gardner et al., 1990; Ostrom et al., 1992; Chichilnisky, 1994; Sethi and Somanathan, 1996; Dayton-Johnson 
and Bardhan, 2002). Game theory provides a useful tool for many problems in environmental economics. The 
theory is concerned with the strategic action of different agents/players where these actions are in some way 
interlinked. It is said that the absence of private property rights in common property resources is characterized 
by a negative externality whenever the resource is scare; this leads to inefficiently high levels of extraction, 
possibly high enough to exceed the maximum sustainable yield, and threaten thereby the long run viability of 
the resource. But there is considerable literature of common pool resource game which suggests that 
cooperative management of common property resources guided by social norms and customs have been 
successful over long period of time (Fudenberg and Maskin, 1986; Williamsen, 1985; Ostrom, 1990; Ostrom et 
al., 1990; Hecheter, 1987; Acherson, 1993; Sethi and Somanathan, 1996). In a study of CPR institution, Cordell 
and McKean (1992) identity the established codes of conduct which are far more binding on individual 
conscience than any governmental regulations. These codes of conduct serve to ensure both sustainable 
aggregate harvests and an equitable distribution of access to the resource. Acheson (1993) is another example of 
sustainable management of common resources based on customs and social norms. In fact, self-organized CPR 
institutions have been devised without reference to centralized authorities and sustained over long period of 
time (Hechter, 1987; Willamson, 1985). Empirical evidence suggests that individuals facing social dilemmas in 
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many cases develop credible ex ante commitments without relying on external authorities: appropriation from 
CPRs have repeatedly shown their capacity to organize themselves, establish credible commitments, monitor 
each other behavior and impose sanctions on those who breaks their commitments (Gardner et al., 1990; Ostrom 
et al., 1990). Ostrom et al. (1992) find that high level of cooperation can be sustained for the management of 
CPRs if the possibility of pre-game communication is present, with or without the possibility of costly 
sanctions. The game-theoretic model of Sethi and Somanathan (1996) suggests that cooperative behavior guided 
by social norms of restraint may be stable to run the common property resources and pastures in a well defined 
sense against invasion by narrowly self-interested behavior; when the social norms break down, it generally 
lead to the lowering of the long run stock, and possibly to its extraction (p.766). This model follows from 
Somanathan’s (1991) empirical evidence which describes a variety of traditional arrangement guided by social 
norms, customs and courtesy designed to enable Himalayan villages in India exploit their common forest 
sustainably without the possibility of costly sanctions. The CPR game of our study which emerges from our 
empirical evidence seeks to examine as to whether the interaction between community and government over a 
trade off between economic outcome from extracting commonly owned renewable forest resource is beneficial 
for both guided by a variety of institutional arrangements under JFM programme leading to exploit forest 
resource more sustainably compared with the system of strict regulatory policy (SRP) of government before 
JFM. 
IV Survey Design and Methodology 
The data have been collected through an intensive field enquiry covering all members from three sample 
female FPCs and three joint FPCs under Bankura district2 of West Bengal. We have taken samples from all 
forest divisions – Bankura (North), Bankura (South) and Panchayet (SC) – under Bankura district, because 
almost all female FPCs exist in this district only. For the selection of female FPCs, random sampling technique 
(SRSWOR) is used. First, we have taken three sample female FPCs, taking one from each division of the 
district with the method of SRSWOR. Second, we have taken all members of each sample female FPC for our 
study. The number of members of each female FPC has been collected from the records of the respective FPC. 
However, total number of members from three sample-female FPCs is 120 in number – Brindabanpur (56), 
Agua (23), and Malibona (41). To make a comparative study of FPC members between female FPCs and joint 
FPCs, we take three joint FPCs along with three sample female FPCs for our study. First, each joint FPC has 
been selected based on the criterion of close proximity (nearest distance in km.) to each sample female FPC. 
Second, all members of joint FPCs have been selected for our final survey. Total number of members from 
three joint FPCs works out to 182 in number – Katul-2 (93), Balboni (44), and Baragari (45). However, total 
number of members selected for our field survey including female and joint FPCs, work out to 302. It is worth 
mentioning that each FPC was formed in the respective village. So FPC/village is synonymous in the study. 
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The data of six FPC-villages under our study were considered for two-time points – before JFM and 
after JFM situations. The period of collecting data for ‘after situation’ in all FPCs is same – between April 2005 
and March 2006. But the period of data for ‘before situation’ was not same to all FPCs. JFM programme in 
Agua, Belboni, Malibona, Baragari, Brindabanpur and  Katul-2 FPC-villages was started on February 1993, 
February 1993, March 1996, December 1996, April 1991 and September 1990 respectively. ‘Before situation’ 
for each FPC is considered for the preceding one-year period from the starting of JFM programme in the 
respective FPCs. For example, ‘before situation’ in Agua FPC-village was between February 1992 and January 
1993. But the major problems in measuring different socio-economic indicators are the level of measurement 
(household/village/community/group), types of statistical information (variable/attribute), difficulties in 
ascribing the changes to a particular programme (like JFM programme) from other variables (programmes) 
influencing these changes, unit of measurement (for example kilograms/days/standard cattle). To some extent, 
these problems or limitations can be dealt with through the adoption of appropriate techniques of data 
generation and estimation procedures. An appropriate baseline survey of the households would contribute to 
capture the changes better. But such baseline data set are often not available; the problem in such cases is that 
we cannot observe the participating households without observing the programme at the same time. This is the 
major loophole of this study. One way of addressing this problem is to have a control group, which is similar to 
the participating group in all respects except the programme so that the control group may act as the counter 
factual of the participating group. But it is difficult to find such a matching group in this study, because there is 
hardly any household of forest fringe communities without JFM programme in the area we surveyed.  Even the 
recent JFM programmes operating in this area originated before the year 2002. A second best solution in this 
regard is reflexive comparison where ‘before’ and ‘after’ scenarios are compared for the participating 
households. This would be helpful to provide reasonable estimates of the impact provided that there is no 
serious memory lapse problem among the respondents (Ravallion, 2001). But memory lapse is directly related 
to the time, which passes away after initiating the programme. By using the ‘double difference’ method where 
‘before’ and ‘after’ situations are examined for both control and participating groups, these biases can be further 
minimized. Due to non-availability of data of matching control group for the causes mentioned earlier, we had 
to depend on ‘reflexive comparison’ where ‘before’ and ‘after’ situations are examined for participating groups 
only. ‘Before’ and ‘after’ estimation are analyzed for all households involved in the JFM programme under our 
study. More importantly, the share of timber sale received by each FPC from the forest department was equally 
distributed among all households irrespective of the economic status of households. 
As regards the strategy-set of community is concerned, two FPCs – Baragari joint FPC and 
Brindabanpur female FPC – out of six provide some distinguishing features. First, Baragari joint FPC under 
Bankura South Forest Division came into existence in December 1996, although the West Bengal 
Government’s initiative for JFM programme was operative in this forest division on and from 1989, during this 
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period i.e. from 1989 to 1996, the government policy was cooperative but Baragari community’s strategy was 
‘fighting’. This is mainly because of more heterogeneous community structure and high endemic factionalism 
among the community members in this village. Secondly, the establishment of Brindabanpur female FPC under 
Bankura’s Panchayet (SC) Forest Division is a classic example in that a) it is the first female FPC not only in 
West Bengal but also in India; its leader Mrs. Parul Lohar was awarded Government of India’s honour for her 
noble work; still she is the leader of this FPC; and b) unlike the usual practice, the primary initiative for the 
establishment of FPC was taken by the collective action of the members of this locality3. The members of this 
FPC came forward at first for the establishment of female FPC in their locality and local forest officials 
responded after three years. By this transition period community’s policy was cooperative but government 
policy was strict (SRP). The distinguishing feature of Brindabanpur female FPC and Baragari joint FPC, 
however, helps us calculate the economic outcome of forest fringe community and government for their two 
distinct strategy profiles {FP, CP} and {CP, SRP}, the first and second actions of each distinct strategy profile 
being the community and the government respectively, based on our field survey. 
This study considers simple technique of measurement like arithmetic mean, proportion, and tabular 
analysis for examining our stated objective. The outcome of the strategy profiles of government and community 
has been explained in simple game theoretic approach along with common pool resource (CPR) game presented 
in the appendix. Additionally, a simple mathematical model is also used for our study. 
V Findings 
At the very outset, we examine some basic characteristics of our sample FPCs (Table 1). First, all 
members of FPCs – both female and joint – in five FPCs out of six are either SC or ST (column 11).  In 
Baragari joint FPC, about 90 per cent of members do not belong to SC/ST. Second, about 43 per cent of 
households (129 out of 302 cases) are landless, about 45 per cent of households are marginal and the rest, about 
12 per cent are small (columns 7, 8 and 9 respectively). In our sample there is no household, which belongs to 
medium or big category4. Third, over 77 per cent of households in each village live below poverty line5 
(column 5), the incidence of poverty being the lowest in Baragari (77.78 percentage). Fourth, except Baragari 
and Katul-2, majority of members in each village are illiterate (column 12). This study, however, indicates the 
abject economic and social conditions of the tribal people who are among the most disadvantaged group in rural 
Indian society.  
Table 2 presents annual net real income (in Rs.) of sample households from forest source, non- forest 
source and from all sources along with the change of income between two time points. The real income (in Rs.) 
is determined after deflating the money income by cost of living index (general) of agricultural labourer. As 
mention earlier, we consider the year 2005-06 as the base year. In doing so we use the technique of splicing 
(which consists in combining two or more overlapping series of index number to obtain a single continuous 
series) 6. Table 2 shows the following important results: 1) annual net real income (in Rs.) for all categories of 
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households under our sample except small land holding households in Baragai joint FPC have considerably 
increased (ranging between 12.84 and 41.56 percentage points) after JFM (column 11); 2) the increase of the 
annual net real income of households from all sources is only due to the net increase in income from forest 
source after JFM (column 9); 3) the annual net income from non-forest source of sample households in all FPCs 
has decreased to a large extent (column 10); 4) the dependence on forest income for all categories of households 
has considerably increased after JFM(column 3). Before JFM programme the annual net real income from forest 
source out of annual net income from all sources from sample households ranges between 61.56 percentage 
point and 78.51 percentage points (column 6). It implies that forest was major source of income for all 
categories before JFM; 5) after JFM, annual net income of forest fringe communities has made a substantial 
increase. After JFM programme, the contribution of annual net real income from forest source out of annual net 
real income from all sources from sample households works out between 65.84 and 89.62 percentage points 
except Baragari FPC (column 3); and 6) the incidence of the dependence on forest income is much lower for the 
households belonging to the better economic position on land status after JFM programme (column 9). It is 
important to mention that per capita annual net real income from forest source (PCANRIFS) is considered as 
the economic outcome (payoff) of the community. In order to calculate PCANRIFS, annual net real income 
from forest source of all sample households is divided by total number of members (calculated from columns 3 
and 6 respectively in Table 2).  
The share of annual net real income derived from different sources of forest and non-forest sectors for 
agricultural households (landless, marginal farmer and small farmer) of six FPC-villages (during before and 
after situations of JFM programme) under our study appears in Table 3. Some important features that emerge 
from Table 3 are: i) forest sources – NTFPs, forestry wage and timber forest products (TFPs) – account for 
major share of annual net real income for all categories of households both after and before JFM programme 
situations. After JFM net return from all non-forest sources – farm, non-forest wage and others – have 
decreased for all categories of households except farm income for only small farmer households in Baragari 
FPC. Conversely, annual net real income from two forest sources – NTFPs and forest wage – has increased for 
all except NTFPs source in one category of households – small farmer households in Baragari FPC. As the 
households of small farmer of Baragari FPC could not diversify their income generating activities within forest 
sources – for example, NTFPs – like others, their share of farm income increases by about 11 percentage after 
JFM, although their share of annual net real income from farm source out of their annual net real income from 
all sources are below 20 per cent before and after JFM. ii) more than 80 per cent of annual net real income of 
landless and marginal farmer households, who are relatively asset poor and that also live below poverty line, 
come from forest sources except the same categories of households under Baragari FPC after JFM programme, 
whereas the contribution of net forest income was at best about 65 percentage for the same categories of 
households before JFM (Table 2). The significant increase of forest income after JFM is due to two sources – 
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NTFPs and forest wage, the highest contribution being the NTFPs source (Table 3). However, the incidence of 
forest income is higher for the households which belong to lower land-based economic condition after JFM 
programme. iii) after JFM forest provides much income generating opportunity for all categories of households 
in all FPC-villages. As regard forest wage labour is concerned, not only the landless and marginal categories of 
households but also small farmer category of households are involved in forestry works. This is due to attractive 
high forestry wage rate compared with local wage rate in non-forest sector. Wage rate for forest wage labour is 
fixed at Rs. 67.50, which is about a double of the average local wage rate, for usually eight hours of service 
from 8am to 4pm. But forest wage rate and the number of working days as wage labour under forest department 
by the poor forest fringe communities are more or less fixed. Usually, one person from each poor household 
with a family size of five or less gets the opportunity of forest work from 35-40 days per year. If the size of 
member of a poor household is grater than five, usually, two persons get the opportunity; iii) out of annual net 
real income from all sources, NTFPs’ share has increased in all FPCs for all categories of households, except 
small category of households in Baragari FPC. But most importantly, compared with before JFM period the 
change of annual net income of NTFPs after JFM, particularly, for landless and marginal categories of 
households, who are relatively asset poor than small categories of households and that live below poverty line, 
marks a major increases, ranging between 42.38 percentage point and 440.73 percentage point, in all FPC-
villages excepts landless and marginal categories of households in Baragari village. Conversely annual net real 
income from timber forest products (TFPs) generating from illegal source7 for landless and marginal categories 
of households in Baragari FPC-village has increased during after JFM period as compared with before JFM 
period, whereas net annual real income from TFPs yielding from illegal source for the same categories of 
households in other FPC-villages has considerably decreased during the same period, ranging between 44.27 
percentage point and 72.71 percentage point. Moreover, net annual real income from TFPs has considerably 
decreased for small category of households in all FPC-villages. 
The break-up of annual net real income from legal and illegal forest sources for below poverty line 
households before and after JFM situations appears in Table 4. It reveals that the illegal income from TFPs after 
JFM has substantially increased (30.59 percentage point) to poor categories of households which live below 
poverty line in Baragari joint FPC (column 9). The change of illegal income from TFPs after JFM for the same 
categories of households to other FPC-villages is highly negative (ranging between 20.77 and 74.47 percentage 
points). This is mainly because the change of income from legal forest products of the poor categories of 
households of Baragari FPC after JFM is much lower than that of same categories of households in other FPCs. 
In all FPCs, except Baragari, the change of income from legal sources of forest is highly positive ranging 
between 42.91 percentage point to 117.17 percentage point; in Baragari this change is negative (12.92 
percentage point). It clearly indicates that force or law can not effectively control the illegal collection of TFPs 
 12 
of the poor categories of households, which live below poverty line, until and unless a considerable income 
from legal forest source meets up their bare minimum level of subsistence. 
However, while considering per capita annual net real income from forest source (PCANRIFS) as the 
payoff of the community together with the break-up of share of income from different sources, we also calculate 
the government’s economic outcome by considering annual net real income from forestland per FPC 
(ANRIFFPFPC) as the economic outcome (payoff) of the government. As mentioned earlier, the payoff of the 
Government of West Bengal (GoWB) from the degraded forest, particularly from south West Bengal is 
concerned, was almost nil for her SRP. A little payoff that GoWB would usually receive from this forestland 
was the auction sale of those trees that were removed by rain and/or by storm. As no specific government 
revenue had been reported from the FPC we surveyed before JFM was established and, on the contrary, 
government does not give an account of her little revenue for the particular division as a whole, we consider the 
critical ANRIFFPFPC for government as Re.1 for her SRP. 
  With a list of pure strategies available to each player, we now have the game of two-player (so that the 
industry is a duopoly) with two strategy sets G ={SRP, CP} and C ={FP, CP} along with its four distinct 
strategy profiles {SRP, FP}, {SRP, CP}. {CP, FP}, and {CP, CP} in the following simple form. It is assumed 
that both players choose annual net real income in per capita/per FPC terms rather than annual net money 
income. First, we use normal form of representation in analyzing static game (simultaneous move) of complete 
information8. In figure 1, payoff in the left hand side indicates the payoff of community and right hand side, the 
government’s payoff.   
Obviously for community, FP is strictly dominated by CP, because 2570>2359 and 3723>2613. It seems 
to be important to mention that for government, the strategy SRP is said to be weakly dominated by CP9. But 
when a strictly dominated strategy equilibrium exists we can confidently predict that this will be the outcome of 
the game (Bierman and Fernandez, 1998: 34). So as a rational player, community will not play FP. Thus 
government knows that community is rational; then government will eliminate FP from community’s strategy-
space. SRP is now strictly dominated by CP for government. Thus community knows that government is 
rational, and then community will eliminate SRP from government’s strategy-space leaving the strategy profile 
(CP, CP) as the outcome of the game. This process is called iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies. 
Unlike Prisoner’s Dilemmas case, this outcome is Pareto optimum because it is not dominated by any other 
outcome of the game. The outcome (CP, CP) will hold good as producing cooperative is a dominant strategy for 
community. So the strategy profile (CP, CP) is the unique Nash equilibrium. 
The outcome (CP, CP) will also result if community or government moves first. In the dynamic game of 
complete and perfect information, we may extend the extensive form of representation of a two-player, two-
stage game in figure 2. Here the players move in sequence, all previous moves are common knowledge before 
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the next move is chosen, and the players’ payoff for each feasible combination of moves are common 
knowledge.  
Now if we think of strategies that the players use, we find that government has choices at one node (the 
node A) at which she can choose either SRP or CP. Community has to choose at two different nodes B and D. 
Community’s strategies are (FP, CP), (FP, FP), (CP, CP) and (CP, FP). Now what strategy is then equilibrium 
strategy? 
It can easily be verified that two strategy profiles ({CP}, {FP, CP}), ({CP}, {CP, CP}) are the only 
Nash equilibrium of the game. They both support the equilibrium path A→D→G. 
 
                                                                           Community 
 
                                        (FP, CP)          (FP, FP)              (CP, CP)                        (CP, FP) 
          
Government                SRP       
                          CP  
                                                                                         
 
Do sequential games have equilibra? The answer is yes, because the sequential game is of perfect 
information obtained by the backward induction method. In our game this sequential game has the unique Nash 
equilibrium, which is Pareto optimal. Here the prisoner’s dilemma is especially important for exploring the 
alternative theories of individual and group action: “if individuals are selected to act in their self-interest, all 
will defeat. If they are selected to act the group interest, all will cooperate” (Bergstrom, 2002:69). The CPR 
game is an example of the prisoners’ dilemma type, where cooperation yields an outcome preferred by both 
parties because they are able to negotiate before the start of the game (sequential game) and obtain binding 
commitments (Henley et al., 1997:15). However, the problem of extracting CPR (here forest resources) between 
community and government of this study under JFM is an example of prisoners’ dilemma game where 
cooperation (CP, CP) yields an outcome preferred by both parties as they are able to negotiate before the start of 
the game (sequential form of game) and obtain binding commitments influencing, thereby, a long run viability 
of forest resource (a simple model of CPR game is presented in the appendix). 
 But the long run viability of forest resource depends on the economic outcome of poor forest fringe 
community, which mainly depends on forest resource for their major source of income. As mentioned in Table 
3, the main source of forest income is due to NTFPs. But the price per unit of some NTFPs like kendu leaves 
and sal seed, the collectors receive from its purchasers is very low in relation to the market price. What is more 
significant is that whatever amount of more valuable NTFPs per unit (in Rs.) the collectors desire to sell in the 
market they have only to sell it legally to the agents of LAMS (Large Adibasi Multipurpose Society), which 
usually pay to their collectors considerably lower price per unit for the amount the latter sell to the former. 
          (1, 2359)     (1, 2359)                   (1, 2570)                    (1, 2570) 
  (46650, 3723)     (1, 2613)           (46650, 3723)                    (1, 2613) 
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Table 5 shows that net profit per K.G. of kendu leaves for the agents of LAMPS is about hundred percent of the 
collector’s price. Similarly, net profit per K.G. of sal seeds is more than hundred percent of the collector’s price. 
This situation is more or less similar with Jharkhand state, very close to West Bengal state. In Jharkhand, 
Jharkhand State Forest Development Corporation (JSFDC), licensed traders operating on behalf of the state, 
controls kendu leaves marketing in the state, where villagers are little more than collectors operating as pure 
price takers in a monopsony, with no bargaining position and no incentives to improve quality above minimum 
standards (World Bank, 2006: 46). 
However, the success of JFM programme with respect to economic outcome for forest fringe 
community and government of this study highlights some particular issues of the poor households of 
community, which live below poverty line: 1) more than 80 percent of net annual real income of poor forest 
fringe communities yield from forest source – legal or/and illegal source(s); 2) when NTFPs and wage income 
from forest are inadequate to meet the bare subsistence level of income of the poor forest communities, who 
live below poverty line, they are involved in yielding illegal income by removing timber forest products from 
the forest land to meet up their minimum livelihood security; 3) wage rate for forest wage labour is fixed at Rs. 
67.50, which is about a double of the average local wage rate, for usually eight hours of service from 8am to 
4pm; 4) forest wage rate and the number of working days as wage labour under forest department by the poor 
forest fringe communities during present situation of JFM programme are more or less fixed; 5) the price per 
unit of some NTFPs the collectors (forest communities) receive from the agent of LAMPS is considerably lower 
than market price; and 6) the incidence of the dependence on forest income is considerably higher for the 
households which belong to lower economic condition after JFM programme.   
Hence the issue is: what are the means to overcome the problem of the poor categories of households, 
which live below poverty line, when legal forest income (income from legal forest products like NTFPs, fuel 
wood, timber share from government and wage income from forest) is inadequate to meet up their bare 
minimum level of subsistence? There seems to be three ways to tackle the situation – one is to increase the 
production of quick growing NTFPs, fuel wood etc. in order that the poor households may increase the legal 
collection of those products; but its proper execution is hardly short term in nature. The second is to increase the 
existing government wage rate and the increase of the number of working days as wage labour under the 
department of forest. But the existing government wage rate (Rs. 67.50/- for usually eight hours’ of work a day) 
is high enough as compared with the local wage rate (local wage rate ranges between Rs. 30 to 40 for usually 
eight hours’ of work a day). Similarly the increase of labour days also depends on new aforestation programme, 
which seem to be hardly possible within a short period. The third is to increase the per unit price of Forest 
Products (FPs) the collectors have to sell to the agents of LAMS. This measure seems to be useful for the short 
period. The following simple mathematical model is an attempt to analyse this issue in the short run. 
We assume Ui = Ui(Z1i, Z2i)                                   ….. (1) 
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         where Z1 = Commodity (like TFPs) that yields illegal income, YI (measured in time unit) from 
forest resource;  Z2 = Commodity (like NTFPs, wage-labour on forest related service) that yields legal income, 
YL   (measured in monetary unit) from forest resource; and 
 i = Individual i of poor categories of households which live below poverty line.  
Thus we can write         Z1i ≡    YIi 
                     and             Z2i ≡ YLi 
             then          Ui = f(YI, YL)                        ….. (2) 
YI is risky and punishable offence for the members of a household if legal authority takes action against 
the criminal. But its implications seem to be insignificant for the individuals of very poor category of 
households because YI including YL, which would yield illegal income for all i before JFM programme, was the 
major source of livelihood security for the same categories of households before JFM programme; moreover 
after JFM programme YI is one of the major sources of the income for poor individuals in one FPC (Baragari), 
where legal source of income from forest products is very low in relation to the individuals of very poor 
category of households in other villages ( Table 3). So it is assumed that f(YI, YL) is continuous and has first 
and second order partial derivatives; it is regular strictly quasi-concave function. The rate of substitution of YL 
for YI is 
  – 
2
1
f
f
dY
dY
I
L =  
But YI = TF – [ LL WW +′ ]                                                    ….. (3) 
where TF = Total units of available time for forest work by an individual; ′LW = Total units of available 
time for the collection of legal forest products like NTFPs and LW  = Total time of legal wage work (fixed) 
under forest department. It is assumed that total available time is 24 hours, and the individual will never work 
more than 12 hours per day [
∝−t
Lim ( ′LW + LW ) = 12]. 
Then the budget constraint is   
  YL = p ′LW  + r LW                            ….. (4) 
Where p = price of legal NTFPs; and r = forest wage rate, which is fixed at r . 
Thus U = f(TF – [ LL WW +′ ], p ′LW  + r LW )                 ….. (5) 
To maximize utility we set the derivative of (5) with respect to ′LW  equal zero 
                                                 
′
LdW
dU
= – f1 + f2p = 0 
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and therefore                        – 
2
1
f
f
dY
dY
I
L = = p                      …..(6) 
This second order condition is satisfied provided that it is negative. 
                                              2
2
LWd
Ud
′
= f11 – 2f12 p′+ f22p2 < 0 
Equation (6) is a relation in terms of legal forest work ( ′LW ) and price of legal forest commodities (p) 
and is based on the behavior of individual, who live below poverty line. Equation (6) is, therefore, the supply 
curve for legal forest work and states how much individual i will legally work at various prices of NTFPs. Since 
the supply curve of legal forest work is equivalent to demand for legal income, (6) indirectly provides the 
individual’s demand curve for legal income. We also assume that YI is a normal good.  Then hours in legal 
forest work will increase with the increase of price of NTFPs. The higher price for legal forest products like 
NTFPs will induce the individual i to reduce his illegal work time of forest related work (like collection of 
TFPs) and so reduces YI (Figure 3) so long as individual i’s economic condition does not improve. So, the 
positive relationship between ′LW  and p and the consequent reduction of YI will continue till the point (P3). 
When the price makes individual i so well off that he is induced to cut down legal working time WL (i.e. 
increase the YI time) and earn a higher income.  But this condition implies a better economic condition (or 
upward mobility) of very poor categories of individuals. Practically, when the individual will be well off, he 
will also have more opportunities to increase his income other than forest source. Out study also clearly 
suggests that more well off individuals are less dependent on income from forest resources (Table 2). So P4 
provides an indication that individual i is less dependent on income from forest resource (a better economic 
condition or a upward mobility of individual i). 
VI Conclusions and Policy Implications 
This empirical study suggests that the economic outcome of the JFM programme has been beneficial for 
both community belonging to marginal landholding, small landholding and landless agricultural households and 
government and this is due to the strict dominant cooperative strategy of community. But the earlier forest 
policy of the government was oriented with the commercial need of the government disregarding the traditional 
right and benefit of the forest fringe communities. Economically government was the worst sufferer for her 
SRP, because law or force could not effectively control the illegal collection of forest products of the poor 
forest fringe communities which mainly depend on income from forest resource and that live below poverty 
line, until and unless a bare minimum level of subsistence level of these communities was met up. The success 
of JFM programme has proved that active involvement of forest fringe communities in protection, regeneration 
and development planning of forest resource not only provides a significant increase in income of the 
community but also begets a major increase in income of the government who failed to receive such income 
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while she executed SRP. The higher economic outcome of the government is due to the cooperation of 
community whom government neglected earlier. Similarly, the coordinated action by the community, which 
belong to marginal landholding, small landholding and landless agricultural households, also help them 
generate a substantial increase of forest income after JFM as compared with before JFM mainly from two 
sources – NTFPs and forest wage, the highest contribution being the NTFPs’ source. But the incidence of forest 
income is higher for the households which belong to lower land-based economic condition and that live below 
poverty line after JFM. However, the CPR game of our study, which follows from our empirical evidence, 
suggests that the interaction between community and government over a trade off between economic outcome 
from extracting commonly owned renewable forest resource has been beneficial for both guided by cooperation 
(CP, CP) preferred by both parties within a variety of institutional arrangement under JFM programme leading, 
thereby, to exploit the forest more sustainably compared with the system of strict regulatory policy (SRP) of 
government before JFM. Although forest resource of south West Bengal including our study area was 
resuscitated and restored to productivity with great improved in quality and density after JFM compared with 
before JFM, as mentioned in SFR (2000:47), the institutional arrangement of JFM could not retain the poor 
households which are mainly dependent on forest resource for their livelihood security and that live below 
poverty line, from illegal collection of timber products until and unless a considerable income from legal forest 
sources – NTFPs, forestry wage and government’ timber share – meets their livelihood security. This study also 
suggests that the prices per unit of NTFPs the collectors have to sell to the agents of LAMPS are considerably 
lower than their market prices. 
In this perspective, however, there seems to be three ways to tackle these problems within the existing 
JFM programme – one is to increase the production of quick growing NTFPs, fuelwood etc. in order that the 
very poor households may increase the legal collection of those products; but this depends on the participatory 
forest management programmes and its proper execution which is hardly short term in nature. Secondly, the 
existing government wage rate on forest work is considerably higher (about a double) than that of the average 
local wage rate. The increase of labour days by the forest department depends on new afforestation programme, 
which also seems to be hardly possible within a short period. The third is to increase the price per unit of 
NTFPs the collectors have to sell to the agents of LAMS.  So, in order to have the higher economic outcome 
and the higher outreach of the JFM programme, government should restrict the power of the LAMPS so that the 
collectors of NTFPs may sell their products at a higher price in the market and increase their income. But the 
increase of the collectors’ price of NTFPs may not increase considerable income of the households below 
poverty line for the long period. Together with it, more pro-poor programmes under both government and non-
government initiatives that complement the benefit of JFM programme need to be introduced.  
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Notes 
1. Farm income implies earnings from sales of field crops including fruit crops. Self-employment includes non-
forest based business like resale of agricultural commodities, tailor, money lending, sales of fish, grocery sales, 
public transport operation, radio and bike repair, tinsmith, and stone breaking. Wage work includes non-forest 
off-farm employment like contract agricultural labour, forestry officer, teacher, mechanic, watchman, and 
village headperson. Sales assets consider sales of livestock and poultry, property rental, and sales of personal 
and household items. Transfers include remittance from household residents, gifts from relatives, and loans. 
2. We take all samples for our study from Bankura district only since almost all female FPCs in West Bengal 
are operating in Bankura district, being extended to all three forest divisions – Bankura (north), Bankura 
(south), and Panchet S C – of the district. As this paper has been prepared based on PhD research work entitled 
‘Women’s Dependence on Forest and Participation in Forestry: A Case Study of Joint Forest Management 
Programme in West Bengal’, we consider all samples from Bankura district in south West Bengal where the 
vast tract of forest land containing mainly the sal were overexploited and degraded before JFM situation. After 
JFM the forest land under our study have been resuscitated and restored to productivity with great improvement 
in quality and density. 
3. It is worth mentioning that forest officials usually take the primary initiative (during 1988-89) for the 
establishment of both joint FPC and female FPCs in this area. They first speak to the local forest communities, 
local panchayet bodies about the utility of the establishment of FPC under JFM programme. Later, local forest 
communities and local panchayet respond to it. 
4. In the irrigated area households possessing cultivable land between 0.01 and 2.49 acres are treated as 
marginal farmer households, between 2.50 and 4.99 acres, as small farmer households, while in the unirrigated 
area, this is twice the area of their irrigated lands.  
5. Poverty line income in rural West Bengal on the basis of PCME (per capita monthly expenditure) by NSS of 
55th round (1999-00) is Rs. 350.17. Based on the CPIAL (Consumer Price Index of Agricultural Labour 
[General]) per capita monthly expenditure for the year 2005-06, the poverty line income for the year 2005-06 is 
calculated as Rs. 393 approximately.  
6. Indian Labour Journal (1991, Vol. 32, No. 4: p. 662) provides the Consumer Price Index Number of 
Agriculture Labour (General) for rural West Bengal on and from 1990-91 to 1995-96, the base year being 1960-
61. Similarly, Indian Labour Journal (2005, Vol. 46, No. 12: p. 1225) provides the same for rural West Bengal 
on and from 1995-96 to 2005-06 with 1986-87 as base year. We then shift the base year of 1960-61 to 1986-87 
for all the years from 1990-91 to 2005-06. Again we shift the base year from 1986-87 to 2005-06 and calculate 
the CPIAL from 1990-91 to 2005-06. 
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7. Never did the respondents say that their source of income was illegal; rather, while examining the answer 
from the respondents regarding their break-up of their source of income, the distinction between legal and 
illegal source was clearly demarcated.   
8. It might be a game of complete information because each player’s payoff function (the function that 
determines the player’s payoff from the combination of action chosen by the players) is common knowledge 
among all the players (Gibbons, 1992: 2). 
9. SRP is no longer strictly dominated by CP, because both strategies provide same payoff (Re 1) to the 
government if community adopts a FP strategy, but strictly higher payoff to government if community adopts 
CP. 
 
Appendix :  
We start with a static model of the CPR as an n-person game (Dasgupta and Heal, 1979; Chichilnisky, 
1994; Ostrom et al., 1992) which has been used by Sethi and Somanathan (1996). We exclude the assumption 
of costly sanction on the violation of illegal collection of forest products or of institutional arrangement under 
JFM. As mentioned in the text, institutional arrangement of JFM could not restrain the poor households, which 
are mainly dependent on forest resource for their livelihood security and that live below poverty line, from 
illegal collection of forest products (timber) until and unless a considerable income from legal forest sources 
meets up their minimum livelihood security. Force or law can not effectively control the illegal collection of 
TFPs of the landless and marginal categories of households. Hence the possibility of costly sanction against the 
violation of extracting illegal forest products under JFM programme of this study is ruled out. We also assume a 
fixed number of n individuals who have complete rights of access and removal to the forest resource, a 
renewable natural resource, from a ‘common pool’ under institutional arrangements of JFM. Let the labour or 
effort expanded per unit of time by agent (FPC member household) i on resource extraction be li and the 
aggregate lobour expanded, L. The sum of individual labour flows: 
                          ∑
=
=
n
i
ilL
1
 
First, we assume the case where the total stock of resource K=Ko, an exogenously given constant. Then 
the aggregate harvesting per unit of time is a function of aggregate flow L and exogenously given constant Ko 
i.e. 
 
h(L, Ko) = f(L)   …………….(1) 
We assume fL>0, fLL<0 i.e. the total harvest per unit of time is an increasing function of effort and the 
value of the function is increasing at a deceasing rate. We also assume A(L)= f(L)/L is decreasing. Each extra 
effort (labour) of an individual FPC member reduces the harvest available for other FPC member and therefore 
the average harvest. In other words f(L)/L diminishes as li increases. Let us assume that the cost of labour per 
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unit of time is w, which is constant and exogenously given. This is true because empirical evidence of this study 
reveals that the wage rate for forest wage labour per day is fixed at Rs.67.50 (discussed in the text). If we 
normalize the price of resource to unity, the efficient level of effort (we ignore changes in the stock) at which 
the marginal product of labour equals the wage 
           ( ) wLf =′  …………….(2) 
The share of total harvest obtained by ith FPC member is directly proportional to the share of FPC 
member i’s effort to total effort, so that FPC member i’s net benefit from resource extraction, denoted by Πi , is 
Πi (l1, l2,….., ln) = ( ) ii wlLfL
l
−  
Therefore the aggregate payoff p (l1, l2, ....., ln) satisfies 
( ) ( )∑
=
−==
n
i
in wLLflllp
1
21 ,....., π  
Let cL ˆ be the level of aggregate effort which maximizes p. this is the efficient level of effort (given the 
stock) at which the marginal product of labour equals the wage ( ) wLf c =′ ˆ . 
This is shown in Figure a. cL ˆ is unique due to concavity of the function. 
Let us now examine what the outcome will be under the usual assumption of rational, self-interested 
behaviour by each FPC member. Each FPC member will compare his/her return ( )LLfLA /)()( = with the cost 
of effort, w . Concavity of the function means that A(L)  is decreasing (mentioned earlier). The FPC member 
intending harvesting an additional unit will compare f(L+1)/(L+1) with w and will go on harvesting if 
f(L+1)/(L+1)> w . However, from individual point of view labour will be added to the stock harvesting until 
wcLC =&& / (Figure a). This may be interpreted as free entry, zero profit condition with 
A(L) w=   ……………(3) 
Payoff of ith FPC member is now 
Πi (li, L) ( )wLAli −= )(  
While the aggregate payoff is  
P ( )wLAL −= )(  
Thus if the resource is characterized by open access, so that the number of user can expand without 
limit, then it is clear that labour will be put in until the average product equals the wage and rents(profits) are 
driven to zero as shown at CL &  in Figure a. This is clearly inefficient, because adding harvesting has a negative 
externality effect on the forest resource. However, disregarding the negative externality, each individual will put 
in more labour them is efficient so long as there is positively rent (profit) from the extraction (or harvesting). 
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The CRP game has a unique Nash equilibrium, which is symmetric with Li cL=  for all FPC members. It is 
inefficient and involves overexploitation CC LL <ˆ . There are positive rents in equilibrium: CCC LnLL &<=  so 
that wLA C >)( . This is the classic problem of the common users: each individual would be better off if all 
would restrain their use, but it is never in the interest of any individual to do so (Dasgupta and Heal,1979; 
Hardin, 1968; Weitzman, 1974; Sethi and Somanathan, 1996). 
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In the case of resource dynamics, the case of renewable forest resources is different from the assumption 
of exogenously given forest resource by virtue of the fact that it is naturally generated within a time period 
relevant to human exploitation. Renewable resources are often assumed to follow a ‘natural growth law’ which 
is assumed to be simply a function of the size of resource stock. The relationship is not monotonic, but inverse 
U-shape (the logistic growth function). The growth rate at first rises with the size of stock, and then falls i.e., the 
slope of the curve is positive and decreasing. It is due to the fact that the natural environment has a ‘carrying 
capacity’ for the resource; a maximum population that it can sustain. There is zero growth rate for this size of 
stock. We assume equal effort level by each type of player – government and community – under cooperative 
management of forest in the dynamic analysis. This is, mainly, because the CPR game of our study considers 
two types of players – community and government – in community forestry where forest department and 
community jointly manage the forest protection activities within a joint cooperative institutional framework 
without any costly sanctions. Hence we assume equal effort level for both – community and government. Then 
there is the unique Nash equilibrium for all FPC members at which maximum sustainable yield is equated to the 
corresponding resource stock. This stage is called the socially optimum average effort level corresponding to 
CL &  
MR 
AR 
TR 
AC = MC = w 
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the resource stock (Sethi and Somanathan, 1996, 777-8). This is shown at KM in Figure b. If we indigenize K, 
the aggregate harvest per unit of time is a function 
H(L, K)  ……………………(4) 
As renewable resources are often assumed to follow natural growth law, HK>0, HKK<0. 
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 In addition to its dependence on the harvest, the evolution of the resource stock will depend on its own 
natural rate of replenishment, which we represent by the differentiable function R(K). There is finite carrying 
capacity of the resource stock (KL in Figure b) so that R(K)<0 for K>KL, and R(KL) = 0. Let KF>0 be the 
minimum viable stock, so that R(K) > 0 for KF<K<KL, and R(K) < 0 for 0<K<KF. The minimum viable stock is 
the level below which the resource can not recover by natural reproduction even in the absence of harvesting. 
Finally, let R be a unique maximum at some KM. This is the standard specification used to characterize the 
dynamic of renewable resources. The growth rate of the resource stock, taking account of harvesting, is then 
given by  
),()( KLHKIK −=&  ……………(5) 
The extraction per unit of effort is assumed constant proportion of the stock. Letting LM(K) denote the 
(statistically) socially optimum average effort level and LN(K) denotes the Nash equilibrium effort level 
corresponding to resource stock K, it is clear that LM(K)=LN(K)=0. The stable cooperative equilibrium point of 
the system is the type of behaviour and levels of resource stock that we may expect to see in the long run. This 
is satisfied at the aggregate effort levels L and resource stock K for which 0=K& . For any KF<K<KL, I(K)>0, so 
by putting in enough effort the harvest can be raised high enough that it equals the rate of replenishment, thus 
causing K&  to equals zero (KM in Figure b). The average product now depends both on aggregate extraction 
effort and the resource stock 
L
KLHKLA ),(),( =  
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As we assume equal effort level for each type of player – government and community – under 
cooperative management of forest, the payoff of each type of player will be  
( )wKLAKlii −= ),()(π  
Therefore, the aggregate payoff is  
( )wKLAKL
n
i
i −=∑
=
),()(
1
π  
In this perspective it is relevant to mention that the game theoretic framework of Sethi and 
Somanathan(1996) shows that whenever there is a stable non-cooperative equilibrium (one in which individuals 
do not restrain their use with different effort level) with a positive renewable stock, then there is a cooperative 
equilibrium with a higher stock and that cooperative norms of behaviour is stable. The CPR model of our study 
also suggests that in spite of equal effort level for each type of player, cooperative equilibrium is also stable 
with the highest level of stock. 
Let us consider a two stage game: the first stage discussed in the CPR game and the second one is the 
game in which individuals have the option of imposing sanctions on other agent in response to their observed 
extraction level. Sanctioning behaviour is costly not only for the punished, but also for the punisher (Sethi and 
Somanathan, 1996:771). But such a sanctioning behaviour is unimportant in our empirical study. Hence at KM, 
there is unique sub-game perfect equilibrium in which all agents choose LN effort level and no agent sanctions 
any other. Hirshleifer and Rasmusen (1989) show that cooperation can be sustained in sub-game perfect 
equilibrium in a finitely repeated prisoners’ dilemma with rationing. Ostrom et al.(1992) show that even in 
clearing specified finite horizon games designed to extract commons, high level cooperation can be sustained if 
the possibility of pre-game communication is present, with or without the possibility of costly sanctions. It 
seems to be relevant to mention that despite without the possibility of costly sanctions against the violators 
(poor forest fringe communities) of extracting illegal forest products, forest resources in south West Bengal 
including our study area was resuscitated and restored to productivity with great improvement in quality and 
density as a result of participatory and JFM activities compared with before JFM situation (SFR, 2000:47). 
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 Table 1: Some Basic Characteristics of the Sample FPC/Village Households 
Status of agricultural land 
holding**  
Sex of FPC 
member 
 
Division 
 
FPC/Village 
 
No. of 
HH 
 
Average 
size of HH 
% of HH 
live below 
poverty 
 line* 
    
   Size of forest land 
    (ha.) protected  
      under JFMP Land less Marginal Small Female {Male} 
  % of HH 
  belongs to 
  SC [ST]  
  category 
% of  
 illiterate 
FPC  
 member 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Agua 23 4.52 100 13.75 19 4 0 23{0} 100 [0] 95.24 Bankura 
North Belboni 44 4.95 100 70 41 3 0 2{42} 100 [0] 86.36 
Malibona 41 4.97 95.12 70 4 35 2 41{0} 9.75[90.25] 51.22 Bankura 
South Baragari 45 5.44 77.78 70 3 32 10 2{43}  2.22 [8.89] 33.33 
 Brindabanpur 56 4.80 80.36 56 29 16 11 56{0} 100 [0] 77.50  Panchayet 
S C Katul-2 93 5.08 84.95 180 33 46 14 3{90} 100 [0] 42.63 
  
* Poverty line in year 2005-06 is per capita expenditure of Rs. 393 /- 
       * * Holding of agricultural land from 0.01 to 2.50 acres are treated as marginal, from 2.51 to 5.00 acres as small. For irrigated land these 
would be doubled.  
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Table 2: Annual Net Real Income (in Rs.) from All Sources of Sample Households* 
* The real income is determined after deflating the money income by cost of living index (general) of agricultural labour. We consider 2005-06 as the base year. 
   CV = coefficient of variation. 
Present Before % change  
 
FPC/ Village 
 
 
Category
of 
  house-
holds 
Net return from 
forest  
   sources 
                   CV 
Net return from 
non-forest 
  sources 
                  CV 
Net return 
 from all  
  sources 
                 CV 
Net return from 
forest  
   sources 
                   CV 
 Net return   from 
non-forest  
   sources 
               CV 
Net  return  
from all 
   sources 
                 CV 
Net return 
from 
forest 
sources 
Net return 
from non-
forest 
source 
Net  
return 
from all 
sources 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 
Landless 
 
327825.8 
(86.14) 
0.29 52747.4 
(13.86) 
1.48 380573.2 
(100.00) 
1.08 
 
173018.4 
(64.36) 
0.36 95810.6 
(35.64) 
3.42 268829.0 
(100.00) 
2.11 
 
89.47 - 44.95 41.56  
Agua 
Marginal 
 
65496.0 
(85.06) 
0.38 11503.8 
(14.94) 
1.59 76999.80 
(100.00) 
1.19 
 
42175.6 
(67.87) 
0.48 19964.2 
(32.13) 
3.96 62139.8 
(100.00) 
2.49 
 
55.29 
 
- 42.38 
 
38.04 
 
Landless 
 
766193.2 
(87.66) 
0.24 107857.9 
(12.34) 
1.16 874051.1 
(100.00) 
1.01 
 
430512.0 
(63.92) 
0.33 243004.9 
(36.08) 
3.09 673516.9 
(100.00) 
1.90 
 
77.97 
 
- 55.61 29.77  
Belboni 
Marginal 
 
53202.7 
(85.84) 
0.30 8776.2 
(14.16) 
1.31 61978.9 
(100.00) 
1.12 
 
31508.2 
(64.89) 
0.44 17048.2 
(35.11) 
3.48 48556.4 
(100.00) 
2.21 
 
68.85 - 48.52 27.64 
Landless 
 
76308.4 
(89.62) 
0.32 8838.2 
(10.38) 
1.86 85146.6 
(100.00) 
1.30 
 
44898.8 
(65.12) 
0.38 24049.1 
(34.88) 
3.57 68947.9 
(100.00) 
2.20 
 
69.96 - 63.25 23.49 
Marginal 
 
681299.2 
(88.18) 
0.41 91324.0 
(11.82) 
1.92 772623.2 
(100.00) 
1.39 
 
425916.3 
(64.88) 
0.51 230551.6 
(35.12) 
3.95 656467.9 
(100.00) 
2.53 
 
59.96 - 60.39 17.69 
 
 
Malibona 
Small 
 
37745.8 
(86.20) 
0.83 6042.8 
(13.80) 
2.21 43788.60 
(100.00) 
1.96 
 
26510.9 
(78.51) 
1.25 7256.4 
(21.49) 
4.12 33767.3 
(100.00) 
3.36 
 
42.38 - 16.72 29.68 
Landless 
 
51154.2 
(72.16) 
0.39 19735.8 
(27.84) 
1.66 70890.00 
(100.00) 
1.27 
 
38831.5 
(64.11) 
0.62 21738.6 
(35.89) 
3.75 60570.1 
(100.00) 
2.54 
 
31.73 - 9.21 17.04 
Marginal 
 
574257.2 
(70.75) 
0.58 237413.8 
(29.25) 
2.12 811671.0 
(100.00) 
1.69 
 
460344.3 
(64.00) 
0.99 258943.6 
(36.00) 
3.92 719287.9 
(100.00) 
3.02 
 
24.74 - 8.31 12.84 
 
 
Baragari 
Small 
 
133182.4 
(56.06) 
0.98 104388.8 
(43.94) 
2.57 237571.2 
(100.00) 
2.31 
 
140987.2 
(61.56) 
1.67 88036.8 
(38.44) 
4.26 229024.0 
(100.00) 
3.85 
 
- 5.53 - 18.60 3.73 
Landless 
 
574140.6 
(81.24) 
0.35 132581.0 
(18.76) 
1.75 706721.6 
(100.00) 
1.25 
 
360161.6 
(62.10) 
0.41 219808.8 
(37.90) 
3.41 579970.4 
(100.00) 
2.17 
 
59.41 - 39.68 21.85 
Marginal 
 
298869.9 
(80.91) 
0.44 70515.7 
(19.09) 
1.99 369385.6 
(100.00) 
1.48 
 
214342.2 
(66.40) 
0.83 108461.4 
(33.60) 
3.68 322803.6 
(100.00) 
2.71 
 
43.42 - 34.98 14.43 
 
  
Brindabanpur 
Small 
 
166586.3 
(79.83) 
0.76 42090.1 
(20.17) 
2.57 208676.4 
(100.00) 
2.09 
 
116871.0 
(70.58) 
1.08 48718.5 
(29.42) 
3.89 165589.5 
(100.00) 
3.09 
 
42.54 - 13.60 26.02 
Landless 
 
651273.6 
(83.12) 
0.36 132260.6 
(16.88) 
1.82 783534.2 
(100.00) 
1.31 
 
374660.7 
(63.23) 
0.59 217875.5 
(36.77) 
3.50 592536.2 
(100.00) 
2.40 
 
73.83 - 39.29 32.23 
Marginal 
 
846732.2 
(82.55) 
0.51 178988.2 
(17.45) 
2.04 1025720.4 
(100.00) 
1.56 
 
519358.3 
(65.25) 
0.92 276542.3 
(34.75) 
3.82 795900.6 
(100.00) 
2.88 
 
63.03 - 35.28 28.87 
 
 
Katul-2 
Small 
 
295158.8 
(80.72) 
0.85 70498.8 
(19.28) 
2.55 
 
365657.6 
(100.00) 
2.18 
 
211210.5 
(72.20) 
1.14 81344.8 
(27.80) 
4.01 292553.3 
(100.00) 
3.20 
 
39.75 - 13.33 24.99 
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 Table 3: Annual Net Real Income Share (in percentage) by Sources of Sample Households 
Net return from forest sources Net return from non-forest sources % change 
TFPsa Net return from forest sources Net return from non-forest sources 
FPC/Village Category 
of 
households 
 
NTFPs 
Forestry 
wage Total Illegal 
 
Farmb 
Non-forest 
wagec 
 
Othersd NTFPs Forestry wage TFPs Farm Non-forest wage Others 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
Landless 58.68 
(19.67) 
14.52 
(8.24) 
11.86 
(36.45) 
11.67 
(36.45) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
8.59 
(25.35) 
5.27 
(10.29) 
198.32 76.21 - 64.50 
[- 67.98] 
- - 66.11 - 48.79  
Agua Marginal 58.92 
(22.73) 
13.97 
(8.27) 
11.17 
(36.87) 
10.86 
(36.87) 
5.08 
(5.99) 
4.31 
(14.21) 
5.55 
(11.93) 
159.21 68.92 -66.99 
[- 70.57] 
- 15.19 - 69.67 - 53.48 
Landless 53.56 
(15.75) 
15.35 
(7.50) 
17.32 
(40.67) 
17.18 
(40.67) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
8.83 
(26.64) 
3.51 
(9.44) 
240.19 104.67 - 53.91 
[- 57.76] 
- - 66.85 - 62.82  
Belboni Marginal 54.54 
(14.45) 
13.34 
(8.18) 
16.96 
(42.26) 
16.34 
(42.26) 
4.72 
(5.17) 
4.55 
(18.78) 
4.89 
(11.16) 
277.47 63.08 - 57.51 
[- 61.33] 
- 8.70 - 75.77 - 56.18 
Landless 53.61 
(19.46) 
16.34 
(10.36) 
18.46 
(35.30) 
18.58 
(35.30) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
6.80 
(23.62) 
3.58 
(11.26) 
175.47 57.72 - 44.27 
[- 47.37] 
- - 71.21 - 68.21 
Marginal 55.93 
(19.61) 
14.17 
(10.41) 
17.68 
(34.86) 
17.03 
(34.86) 
4.58 
(4.90) 
2.40 
(16.45) 
4.84 
(13.77) 
185.19 36.12 - 48.12 
[- 51.15] 
- 6.53 - 85.41 - 64.85 
 
 
 
Malibona 
 
 
Small 59.79 
(38.14) 
11.62 
(7.75) 
14.79 
(32.62) 
13.73 
(32.62) 
7.35 
(7.62) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
6.45 
(13.87) 
56.76 49.94 - 54.66 
[- 57.92] 
- 3.54 - - 53.50 
Landless 17.55 
(14.46) 
8.61 
(6.64) 
45.99 
(43.01) 
44.85 
(43.01) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
18.44 
(22.45) 
9.40 
(13.44) 
21.39 29.67 6.94 
[4.28] 
- - 17.86 - 30.06 
Marginal 18.36 
(17.07) 
8.51 
(5.87) 
43.17 
(41.06) 
42.81 
(41.06) 
3.88 
(4.05) 
15.50 
(18.20) 
9.87 
(13.75) 
7.57 44.97 6.86 
[4.26] 
- 4.20 - 14.84 - 28.22 
 
 
 
Baragari 
 
 
Small 19.45 
(20.44) 
4.77 
(3.15) 
31.84 
(37.97) 
30.70 
(37.97) 
19.48 
(17.55) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
24.46 
(20.89) 
- 4.84 51.43 - 16.14 
[- 19.15] 
11.00 - - 17.09 
Landless 57.77 
(34.85) 
17.61 
(8.16) 
4.09 
(19.09) 
3.51 
(19.09) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
10.30 
(22.15) 
8.46 
(15.75) 
65.76 115.81 - 69.30 
[- 81.61] 
- - 53.50 - 46.29 
Marginal 58.89 
(41.36) 
17.24 
(8.08) 
3.41 
(16.96) 
2.30 
(16.96) 
6.32 
(7.56) 
4.07 
(9.86) 
8.70 
(16.18) 
42.38 113.37 - 71.80 
[- 86.44] 
- 16.4 -58.72 - 46.23 
 
 
 
Brindabanpur 
 
 
Small 64.62 
(48.39) 
12.05 
(6.40) 
3.16 
(15.79) 
0.14 
(15.79) 
10.94 
(12.05) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
9.23 
(17.37) 
33.54 88.28 - 79.99 
[- 99.11] 
- 9.21 - - 46.86 
Landless 52.77 
(9.76) 
16.47 
(7.42) 
12.45 
(46.05) 
12.75 
(46.05) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
9.60 
(23.88) 
7.28 
(12.89) 
440.73 121.97 - 69.87 
[- 72.31] 
- - 59.80 - 43.52 
Marginal 54.67 
(14.01) 
15.80 
(6.98) 
11.78 
(44.26) 
10.88 
(44.26) 
6.57 
(6.90) 
3.25 
(12.84) 
7.63 
(15.01) 
290.23 126.36 - 72.71 
[- 75.42] 
- 4.78 - 74.69 - 49.17 
 
 
 
Katul-2 
 
 
Small 59.90 
(26.24) 
11.48 
(5.33) 
9.34 
(40.63) 
8.32 
(40.63) 
11.06 
(11.51) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
8.22 
(16.29) 
128.28 115.38 - 77.01 
[- 79.53] 
- 3.91 - - 49.54 
 Notes: 1. Figures within ( ) and [ ] represent the value during before situation of JFM programme and percentage change of illegal timber forest products respectively; 
            2. a) TFPs(timber forest products) include net return from two sources – share from government’ timber sale and sale of illegally collected timber; b) net return 
from sale of farm crops including households crops; c) non-forest wage includes farm and/or non-farm labour wage other than forest wage employment; and 
d) others’ non-forest source includes net return from self-employment(business activities like market middle man, tailor, and radio and bike repair) and net 
return from sale of livestock, personal and household items etc. 
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 Table 4: Annual Net Real Income (Rs.) from Forest for BPL Categories of Households  
Present net return of forest from Before net return of forest from % change  FPC/ Village 
Legal 
sources 
Illegal 
sources 
All 
sources 
Legal 
sources 
Illegal 
sources 
All 
sources 
Legal 
sources 
Illegal 
sources 
All 
sources 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Agua 281848 
(71.66) 
45360 
(11.53) 
393322 
[85.96] 
136594 
(63.47) 
78600 
(36.52) 
215194 
[65.00] 
106.34 
 
- 42.29 
 
82.78 
Belboni 549153 
(67.02) 
140280 
(17.12) 
819396 
[87.54] 
273620 
(59.22) 
188400 
(40.78) 
462020 
[63.98] 
100.70 
 
- 25.54 
 
77.35 
Malibona 516157 
(68.13) 
130200 
(17.19) 
757608 
[88.32] 
306487 
(65.10) 
164278 
(34.90) 
470765 
[64.90] 
68.41 
 
- 20.77 
 
60.93 
Baragari 255426 
(40.84) 
268800 
(42.98) 
625411 
[70.86] 
293343 
(58.76) 
205833 
(41.23) 
499176 
[64.00] 
- 12.92 
 
30.59 
 
25.28 
 Brindabanpur 670515 
(76.80) 
26880 
(3.08) 
873010 
[81.13] 
469198 
(81.67) 
105306 
(18.33) 
574504 
[63.64] 
42.91 
 
- 74.47 
 
51.96 
Katul-2 1067680 
(71.27) 
174720 
(11.66) 
1498006 
[82.80] 
491638 
(54.99) 
402381 
(45.01) 
894019 
[64.39] 
117.17 
 
- 56.58 
 
67.56 
Total  → 556796 
(67.13) 
131040 
(15.83) 
827792 
[82.51] 
328480 
(63.26) 
190808 
(36.74) 
519288 
[64.25] 
69.51 - 31.32 59.41 
 * Figures within ( ) represent percentages out of total forest income; Figures within [ ] represent percentages of forest income out of total income. 
  
 
 
 
 
 Table 5: Variation in Price of Some Valuable NTFPs the Collectors’ sell to the Agents of LAMPS 
                        Rs. per KG 
          Midvalue and range+ 
Name of NTFPs  Collectors’ price       Processing, transport and other costs                                 Market price                             Profit * 
1            2                                                 3                                                          4                                         5 
Kendu leaves 
Sal seeds 
       20±5                                          13±4                                                    52±4.50                              19±4.50 
    0.75±0.50                                  1.50±0.70                                            4.00±0.60                           1.75±0.60 
   
+  The method is suggested by Rudra (1992) 
* Column 5 = [ 4 – ( 2 + 3 ) ] 
 31 
 
 
                                                                      Government’s strategy   → 
                                                                   SRP                                  CP 
Community’s                            
   strategy       ↓               FP 
                                                 
                                        CP 
 
  Figure 1 
 
 
 
                                                                                                             
                                                     A                                                                               A                         
                             SRP                                CP                                                                     CP         
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
                                                                                                  Equilibrium path           
 
                                
B
                                
D
                                                                               
D
          
 
 
                         FP     CP                   CP     FP                                                           CP 
                                                                                                                                                        
                                                                                                                                   
 Payoff to             E                                     F        G                                      H                                                                            G                                                   
  government     1                        1    46650                   1                                                 46650            
 Payoff to  
 community     2359                2570   3723                  2613                                               3723 
 
Figure 2 
 
                                             YL 
                                          s4                      
             
                                          s3                   
                                                                 
 
                    
 
                                         s2         
                                                 
 
                                         s1          
 
 
                                                                                                                                      
    
                                                                                                                                                                    
YI 
                                                                  
O
              
                        Z                                
                                                                                     
                     
                                                                                           Figure 3 
 
          (2399, 1)                         (2613, 1) 
 
          (2570, 1)                         (3723, 46650) 
 
Community 
Government 
Community Community 
Government 
P4 
P2
 P1 
P3 
IC1 
IC2 
IC3 
IC4 
